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ABSTRACT 
Until recently, Australian federal renewable energy tradable quota policy support 
mechanisms were modest and failed to differentiate between technologies at different stages 
of industry development. Subsequent changes to federal tradable quota schemes and the 
development of a number of state-based feed-in tariffs (FiTs) have attempted to overcome 
recent deficiencies. This research discusses the relationships between federal and state-
based support policies, small wind turbine (SWT) system installed capacity, and the 
intricacies of developing instruments that sustain the renewable energy industry over time. 
The research found the lack of due diligence in policy mechanism development generated 
poor outcomes for the small-scale renewable energy industry and a higher level of political 
risk. Australian state-based FiTs were generally poorly designed with respect to known risks, 
and are unlikely to promote sustainable industry development for small-scale grid-connected 
renewable energy systems, including SWT systems. The research suggests detailed 
independent and collaborative policy development is necessary (prior to policy 
implementation) that considers a range of technology types, the influence of other cross-
jurisdictional support mechanisms, and regionally-specific system technical performance and 
project development costs. The recent ‘mixed bag’ of Australian support mechanisms have 
resulted in fluctuating private costs for small-scale systems, which as lead to disruptive 
industry expansion and contraction with ironically unsustainable regularity. 
 
Keywords: wind; small wind turbines; microgeneration; grid-connected; energy policy; feed-
in tariff. 
1. Introduction 
The maintenance of renewable energy support policies that are sensitive to institutional, 
technical, and natural resource diversity is a fundamental challenge [1], Persuading dominant 
political and economic actors to genuinely incorporate long-term external institutional and 
societal capacity building into renewable energy support policies may avoid the continuation of 
mechanisms that have to date been unable to provide a reliable foundation for renewable 
energy industries over time [2]. While market mechanisms as renewable energy policy 
instruments avoid the known pitfall of solely relying on administrative and political 
decisionmaking, the success of the policies within highly constructed electricity markets rely on 
the co-involvement of highly capable private and public decision-makers [3]. The difference 
between renewable energy policy effectiveness in theory and practice is notoriously difficult to 
project, and depends on a number of factors, actors, and political coalitions [4, 5]. 
Compounding this complexity is rapid short-term policy change that disrupts the necessary 
sustained governmental and market actor collaborations that create the institutional capacity to 
develop, evaluate, and implement successful long-term support policies and associated 
industry development strategies [2]. Renewable energy policies that attract little industry 
interest or generate levels of industry growth greater than expected over the short term but 
cannot be sustained financially, risk becoming withdrawn and undermining long term industry 
development [3]. Globally, the current suite of renewable energy policies tend to neglect the 
complex and diverse renewable energy resources and systems, and their unique applications,  
as well as industry needs [3, 6]. 
Renewable energy support policies must deliberately provide attractive investment 
conditions for new market entrants throughout the whole value chain, for a broad range of 
technologies, and support high-risk innovative entrepreneurship - without generating ‘windfall 
profits’ [1]. Tradable green certificate support schemes in the EU have been unable to achieve 
these challenging policy objectives within the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity in 
energy policy reform, and have generally only maintained current levels of renewable energy 
penetration into energy supplies [1]. There are also well-known hazards of FiTs, including 
setting the fixed price too high, and also losing control over market growth [2]. Furthermore, 
renewable energy investment decision-making is rarely a simple ‘rational’ purchasing decision, 
and policymakers should be aware that ‘long-run’ strategic support policies may indeed be 
facilitating financially negative ‘short-run’ consequences for the society, the private investor, 
competing organisations, or all concurrently [6, 7]. In niche renewable energy markets such as 
the small wind energy sector, the bridging of the gap between ‘self-interests’ and the ‘public 
interest’ requires energy policy that reconciles values and interests over various time horizons, 
provides suitable incentives for sustained innovation and entrepreneurship, and that suits the 
characteristics of the local market [5]. There is relatively little new SWT installed capacity in 
Australia when compared to the UK and the USA, both which boast over 100 times the 
Australian SWT installed capacity [8-10]. In markets such as Australia, the USA and the UK, 
it is generally argued that FiTs are more effective than tradable quota schemes in promoting 
the deployment of distributed renewable electricity generation [11, 12], and this work seeks to 
explore if this general argument is consistent within the Australian market in terms of SWTs.  
The Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator (ORER) in Australia has defined a small 
wind turbine (SWT) as one with a rated capacity of ≤10kWp and a total annual electricity output 
of less than 25 MWh [13]. If the SWT industry is to mature in Australia, it must penetrate the 
mainstream small-scale grid-connected market, which is presently dominated by the solar 
photovoltaic (PV) industry [14]. In contrast to large wind farms, small-scale distributed 
generation technologies like SWTs have been viewed as an alternative to centralised 
generation which avoids expensive augmentation of the electricity network [15-18]. Distributed 
generation is also widely discussed in terms of energy security, as it shifts energy supply from 
a reliance on a few central energy sources to a diversified range of sources located 
geographically, leading to increasing network resilience if located appropriately [16, 19-22]. 
Additionally, the introduction of residential and/or community-scale generation technologies 
increases the awareness of energy use and renewable energy system capability, which can 
cultivate parallel adoption of energy efficiency measures [23]. However, the high cost of SWTs 
relative to large centralised electricity supplies is a fundamental barrier preventing the wider 
deployment of SWTs throughout grid-connected Australian communities. While small-scale 
renewable technologies like SWTs have the potential to contribute towards Australia’s 
renewable electricity generation targets [15], the relative infancy of the SWT industry with 
respect to grid-connected applications is contrasted somewhat with the long-term experience 
with SWT installations in remote off-grid applications [24]. Therefore, the SWT industry require 
targeted government support with appropriate development policies if the unique development 
path of the SWT is to be successfully realised in Australia [25]. 
The primary objective of this research is to analyse the existence of both federal and 
state-based support policies since 2001 relevant to SWTs, and present the corresponding 
changes in regional SWT installed capacity over time. A secondary objective of this research 
is to analyse components of the support mechanisms in terms of either providing insufficient 
or wastefully excessive (and often transient) support for the development of a mature SWT 
industry in Australia. The research aims to facilitate the development of a stable, secure, and 
appropriate policy instrument(s) to foster emerging technologies in Australia in an 
economically efficient manner, using SWT installed capacity as an indicator. 
 
2. Material and methods 
An annotated list of the Australian federal and state policies relating to SWTs was 
compiled from government agencies, policy documents, reports, legislation, and peer reviewed 
literature. (The various minor local government initiatives were excluded in this research). The 
current status of the SWT sector in Australia was determined by collating annual SWT 
installations and installed capacity between 2001 and August 2010. This was undertaken by 
analysing the renewable energy certificate (REC) data held by the ORER’s REC Registry.  
The determination of accredited SWT RECs in the REC Registry under each policy 
iteration (such as the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target, MRET, the Renewable Energy 
Target, RET, and the more recent Solar Credits Scheme, SCS), enabled collation of the 
number and the corresponding capacity of annual SWT installations. This collation required 
some assumptions, including the use of the default setting for wind resource availability 
provided by the ORER (2000 hours per year), and that all SWT installations were deemed 
over a 5 year period (the maximum possible for wind technologies). Finally, all installations 
registered after the start date of the SCS (20th Dec 2010) were assumed to have had the first 
1.5 kWp of their capacity calculated under the SCS (to take advantage of a significant capital 
cost rebate). This data analysis is embedded within contextual literature evaluating national 
and international experience of the two reviewed primary policy mechanisms (tradable quota 
schemes and FiTs) from the perspective of the SWT sector.  
3. Results 
3.1. Policies underpinning the SWT sector in Australia 
Table 1: Federal renewable energy policies relevant to SWTs, 2001-2010 
 








To encourage the generation of additional renewable energy, reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, whilst ensuring that the renewable energy sources 






Tradable renewable energy certificates (RECs). 
Scheme Mandates that 20% of Australia’s electricity will be sourced from renewable 
resources by 2020 (45,000 GWh). The RET replaced the Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Target (MRET) and commenced mid 2009. The RET is 
open to all small and large scale renewable technologies. The RET legislation 
creates a legal liability for electricity wholesalers to source a specified annual 
percentage of electricity sales from accredited renewable energy generators. 
Compliance with the scheme is facilitated through the operation of a certificate 
trading market overseen by the ORER. One REC is created by accredited 
renewable energy generator for each MWh sold. Once RECs are registered on 
the REC Registry, they can be traded or sold to liable parties to demonstrate 
their compliance. REC prices are determined by a market. To support small-
scale generation units (SGU) and reduce administrative costs under the RET 
scheme, SGUs can create RECs in batches known as deeming periods. For 
SWT installations RECs can be deemed for either 1 or 5 year deeming periods, 
after which an installation can be redeemed with the approval of the ORER [13].  
 
 





To provide additional support to households, businesses and community groups 
that install small generation units (small wind turbines: no more than 10 kWp 
and with a total annual electricity output of less than 25 MWh are eligible under 




Solar Credits work by multiplying the number of RECs for which SGUs are 
eligible. This policy in effect functions as an upfront rebate towards any eligible 
SGU installation. 
 
Scheme Solar credits apply to the first 1.5 kWp of an installed SGU. The number of 
REC’s that a SWT SGU is eligible for under the RET scheme is determined 
using the multiplier and is entitled to a pre-determined number of deemed RECs 
sold at a fixed value of AUD40.00 [26]. 
It should be noted that the Solar Credit Scheme only applies to the first 
deeming period accredited to an SGU, which corresponds to the first 5 years for 
small wind generators. Additional capacity of a SGU over and above 1.5 kWp is 
calculated under the RET scheme [13].  
 
   
National Solar Schools 
Program 
Objective To assist schools to tackle climate change by allowing schools to: 
generate renewable electricity; improve energy efficiency; provide renewable 
energy education; directly support the growth the of renewable energy industry 





Grant (SWTs are classified as an eligible item under the scheme) 
Scheme Single campus schools: 
• the installation of a minimum 2 kWp PV system will be provided for 
eligible items for up to AUD50,000. 
• if no PV is installed, or if it is less than 2 kWp, a grant of up to 
AUD30,000 is available to be spent on eligible items.  
Multi-campus schools, with a student enrolment of at least 1000 pupils: 
• the installation of two PV systems of at least 2 kWp each is eligible for 
a grant up to AUD100,000.  
• the instillation of one PV system of at least 2 kWp is eligible for a 
grant up to AUD80,000.  
• if no PV is installed or it is less than 2 kWp, a grant of up to 
AUD60,000 is available to be spent on eligible items.  
Note: a SWT is classified as an eligible item under the scheme [27]. 
 
 







Accreditation came into effect December 2010 [13]. 
Objective To ensure the quality and effectiveness of renewable energy system 
installations. The aims of accreditation are:  
• to increase the uptake of renewable energy for the provision of 
energy services, by giving customers increased confidence in the 
design and installation work; 
• to improve safety, performance and reliability of renewable energy 
power systems installed in the field;  
• to encourage industry best practice for all design and installation work 
involving renewable energy systems; and  
•  to provide a network of competent renewable energy system 
designers and installers [13].  
 
Scheme To be eligible under the RET and Solar Credits Scheme new SWT installations 
will be required to be installed by a CEC accredited installer after the 20th 
December 2010 [13]. To become accredited the CEC requires installers to hold 
an unrestricted Electrical Licence and a record of successful completion of the 
following units of competency (UoC): 
• UEENEEK030B – Solve basic problems in wind energy conversion 
systems. 
• UEENEEK031B – Design wind energy conversion systems rated to 
10 kWp. 
• UEENEEK043A – Install small wind energy conversion systems for 
stand-alone systems.  
These UoCs are currently offered by a limited number of TAFE colleges around 
Australia [28].  
 
 
Table 1 summarises the major federal policy pertinent to the SWT industry in Australia. 
The annotated list outlines the objective of each policy, the policy instrument used to 
implement the objective, and a short policy summary. The primary national renewable 
energy policy initiative from 2001 until mid 2009 was the MRET, a tradable quota scheme 
that preceded the current RET. The MRET was limited in its scope, its target was modest, 
and it failed to differentiate the support it provided to renewable technologies at different 
stages of industry development. Whilst large wind farms were a major beneficiary of the 
MRET, least-cost policy support mechanisms purposefully favour near-commercial large-
scale renewable energy technology implementation rather than assisting developing 
technologies such as small-scale PV and SWTs [29-31]. This was reflected in the narrow 
technology mix promoted under the MRET (primarily large-scale hydro and wind projects 
and also solar hot water technology), while small-scale generation technologies represented 
less than 1% of generation assisted under the scheme [14]. The lack of technology diversity 
is a primary criticism of tradable quota schemes [12, 31], and a resultant narrow support for 
a few near market ready technologies was highlighted in ‘the Stern review’ (2007). The 
notable review pointed out that it is not possible to know which technologies will be the most 
successful in the long term, and it is thus important to encourage a diversity of renewable 
energy technologies irrespective of current market readiness [32].  
Table 2 is the estimated annual deployment of SWTs in Australia between 2001 and 
August 2010 derived from the REC Registry database. The stagnation of grid-connected 
SWT deployment during the operational life of the MRET substantiates that least-cost 
policies do not assist small-scale emerging technologies to benefit from economies of scale 
and industry learning. In mid 2009 the MRET was replaced by the RET which mandates that 
20% of Australia’s electricity be sourced from renewables by 2020, and in practice mainly 
supported large-scale renewables. The RET operates in parallel with the SCS which 
provides technology specific support for small-scale renewables. To date this policy 
combination seemingly has stimulated SWT installations in Australia, and by August 2010, 
the installed SWT capacity had reached 669 kWp – around a ten-fold increase in annual 
installed capacity in only 8 months. This is likely to be an unsustainable level of growth, and 
seems to indicate the generation of ‘windfall profits’. However, there are a number of parallel 
policy mechanisms in existence at both the national and state level which complicate this 
simple assertion. Other national policy initiatives such as the National Solar Schools 
Program (recent changes include the scheduled closure two years earlier than expected in 
2013), and the long running, yet now defunct Renewable Remote Power Generation 
Program that provided a capital subsidy to increase the use of renewable generation in off-
grid parts of Australia, largely failed to stimulate SWT deployment over the period when 
compared to solar capacity [18]. 








22 12 17 19 12 6 12 43 57 75 
REC’s 
 160 60 94 172 100 117 62 539 1068 8021 
Annual Installation (kWp) 
 
16.8 6.3 9.9 18.1 10.5 12.3 6.5 56.7 49.3 482.8 
Cumulative Installed (kWp) 
 
16.8 23.1 33.0 51.1 61.6 73.9 80.4 137.1 186.4 669.2 
aAssumptions: Based on a five-year deeming period for SWT REC creation, a 2000 hour annual wind resource 
(considered to be conservative), and any REC registered in the REC Registry after 6th June 2009 was 
categorised under the RET/Solar Credits Scheme. Re-deemed installations have been removed from the data. 
The 2009 data is best viewed as an estimate as it is not possible to determine exactly which installations were 
created under the SCS from the primary Registry data.  Source: [9]. 
 
3.2 The recent influence of the state-based FiTs in Australia 
Whilst the federal RET and SCS implementation may circumstantially seem to have 
stimulated the recent expansion in SWT capacity, new state/territory-based FiTs were also 
introduced in New South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Victoria (VIC) 
and Western Australia (WA) (Table 3). The NSW scheme was introduced at the beginning of 
2010 and guaranteed a premium gross tariff of AUD0.60 per kWh through to the end of 
2016. As Table 4 indicates, there was a staggering 471 kWp of new SWT capacity installed 
in NSW under the FiT, of which all installations would have been eligible for both the federal 








Table 3: State/Territory-based renewable energy policies relevant to SWTs, as of Dec. 2010 
   
 




Territory (ACT)  
 




Stage 1 of this scheme is aimed at householders and small businesses to: 
• promote the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources; 
• to reduce the ACT contribution to anthropogenic climate change; 
• to diversify the ACT energy supply; and  





Gross Feed-In Tariff 
Commenced 1st Mar 2009, and operates for 20 years after an agreement is arranged. 
 
Scheme The scheme is available to all non-government (government schools are also 
eligible) electricity customers with an accredited renewable energy generator 
(PV or wind) of no greater capacity than 30 kWp. The scheme places an 
obligation on electricity suppliers to purchase all electricity generated by an 
eligible generator at a guaranteed premium price for 20 years. The premium 
price is set by the ACT regulator annually at a rate greater than the prevailing 
retail price. Systems connected between 1st Mar 2009 and 30th Jun 2010 will 
receive the premium price of AUD0.5005 per kWh for systems up to 10 kWp. 
Installations greater than 10 kWp and no more than 30 kWp will receive 
AUD0.4004 per kWh. From the 1st of July 2010 the premium price will be 
AUS0.457 per kWh for all systems under the scheme. This scheme is currently 
un-caped, however, new proposed legislation will likely cap total generation 
capacity to 15 MWp [33]. 
 
 
New South Wales (NSW)  
 




The scheme is open to all electricity customers with an annual consumption of 
less than 160 MWh.  
The objectives are to: 
• encourage and support renewable energy; generate employment in 





Gross Feed-In Tariff (paid for by an increase in general electricity prices) 
Commenced 1 January 2010, to operate for 7 years. 
 
Scheme The eligible technologies under the scheme are PV and SWTs no greater than 
10 kWp. The scheme places an obligation on electricity suppliers to purchase all 
electricity generated by an eligible generator at a fixed rate of 60 cents per kWh 
for the 7 year duration of the scheme. A review of the scheme was triggered 
when installed capacity reached 50 MWp in August 2010. In response to the 
review the tariff for new investors has been reduced to AUD0.20 per kWh from 
28th October 2010. In addition, the scheme has also been capped at 300 MWp. 









To provide a framework for reasonable prices and terms and conditions for 
electricity generated from small-scale renewable generators and purchased by 





Net Feed-In Tariff (paid for by an increase in electricity prices) 
Commenced 1st January 2008 
 
Scheme The eligible technologies under the scheme are wind, hydro, biomass, and PV 
systems up to 100 kWp. The scheme is a net tariff with excess generation 
eligible for the standard ‘one for one’ feed-in tariff that electricity retailers are 
obliged to provide under the scheme. In real terms this means that any excess 
generation exported to the grid is purchased by electricity retailers at the 





   
Western Australia (WA) 
 
Residential Net FiT 
Objective To support the installation of residential renewable energy generators and 





Net Feed-In Tariff (a subsidy paid by the WA Government) 
Commenced  1 August 2010, and continues for 10 years after a contract is agreed. 
 
Scheme The scheme is open to all grid connect solar PV, wind and micro hydro systems 
installed in the residential sector, who participate in the Renewable Energy 
Buyback Scheme. Installations up to 5 kWp for Synergy, the Government-
owned disaggregated retailer on the South West Interconnected System 
(SWIS) and up to 10 kWp per installation (maximum installed capacity of 30 kWp 
per residence) for customers of Horizon Power, the Government-owned 
vertically integrated electricity utility operating on networks off the SWIS. The 
scheme pays a set price for any excess electricity exported to the network 
above household consumption. The net FiT is AUD0.40 per kWh. The duration 
is 10 years for each eligible system, and the scheme will be reviewed every 













Buyback Scheme (pays for the value of the electricity to an electricity supplier) 
Commenced NA 
 
Scheme The REBS places an obligation on Synergy and Horizon power to purchase any 
electricity exported to the grid by eligible renewable generators under ‘fair and 
reasonable’ terms and conditions [36]. The REBS is available for renewable 
energy grid-connected systems on the SWIS of capacity between 500 Wp and 
5 kWp. Until 2010, the REBS was calculated on the net import total over the 
billing period, at a tariff equal to the purchase rate minus GST AUD0.1884 per 
kWh. In 2010 this became AUD0.07 per kWh on the SWIS, while the other 
major state-owned retailer, Horizon Power remained at the equal rate minus 
GST. To be eligible for REBS in WA, the customer must be on the A1 or 
SmartPower tariff. [36, 37]. 
 
 
Although the NSW FiT may be subjectively viewed as highly successful to date, it was 
unlikely to promote the sustainable deployment of SWTs in NSW. Due to the apparently 
unexpected high level of uptake of the NSW FiT the first review was triggered in early 
August 2010. The NSW Government subsequently reduced the tariff to AUD0.20 per kWh 
from the 28th October 2010, and installed capacity was capped at a total of 300 MWp, an 
astonishingly high cap for the amended FiT rate [34]. It is unlikely that a non-premium FiT 
tariff similar to the retail rate will attract much additional SWT capacity in NSW, as is the 
case in VIC and WA. As the NSW FiT will be discontinued at the end of 2016, the policy will 
do little to develop a sustainable SWT industry. 
Table 5 compares FiTs for different states and territories of Australia. Interestingly, the 
ACT’s gross FiT exhibits a similar rate (AUD0.50 per kWh) to the original NSW scheme rate, 
yet had not resulted in a single SWT installation by August 2010 since its inception in early 
2009 [9]. This is despite the ACT’s gross FiT exhibiting many of the elements deemed 
necessary to support the deployment of SWTs. The fundamental difference between the 
NSW and the ACT FiT seems to be the uncertain tariff rate from year to year due to the 
annual review by the ACT regulator. While this reduces the uncertainty for Treasury forward 
projections, the policy seems to have created unacceptable uncertainty for SWT project 
developers in the ACT. This uncertainty is contrasted against the similar NSW FiT which 
provided a maximum of only seven years of a fixed rate (despite the non-retrospective 
changes), leading to a rapid rate of SWT installation. Whilst the (maximum) seven years of 
certainty is contrasted against the longer serviceable life of a SWT (around 15 to 20 years), 
this short period appears sufficient for small-scale project developer perception of risk. 
However, this assertion will require detailed research to understand how the perceptions of 
risk/reward and associated uncertainties influence SWT installed capacity when very similar 
jurisdictions with similar policies exhibit a divergence in rates of development. 
 













































20.6 3.3 5.3 6.0 14.4 7.2 0.0 0.0 56.7 
2009 
 
15.2 1.9 3.5 14.7 2.6 11.4 0.0 0.0 49.3 
2010 
 
471.4 1.2 5.4 0.2 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 482.8 
aAssumptions: Based on a five-year deeming period for SWT REC creation, a 2000 hour annual wind resource 
(considered to be conservative), and any REC registered in the REC Registry after 6th June 2009 was 
categorised under the RET/Solar Credits Scheme. Re-deemed installations have been removed from the data. 
The 2009 data is best viewed as an estimate as it is not possible to determine exactly which installations were 







Table 5: Comparison of FiTs relevant to SWT in Australia prior to Jan. 1 2011  
  
Australian State/Territory-based FiTs 
 

































Synergy ≥500 W and  ≤5 
kWp, Horizon Power ≤10 
kWp per installation (total 







AUD 0.60 per kWh 
Revised down to AUD 
0.20 per kWh on the 





Premium tariff (funded 
by government) 
 
Tech. Specific Tariffs 
 
Only in the first year 
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20 years  
 
 








Since the 28th October 
2010 the scheme has 











Australia’s new tradable quota schemes, the RET in combination with the SCS may 
effectively ensure a range of emerging renewable energy generation and/or enabling 
technologies are encouraged, even without state-based FiTs. However, insufficient time has 
elapsed to assess this new federal approach, although it does mirror successful SWT policy 
incentives developed in the UK and the USA. Even so, it is argued that FiTs are more 
effective than tradable quota schemes in promoting the deployment of distributed renewable 
electricity generation [11, 12].  Despite such early results, this argument seems to be 
consistent in Australia. In particular, FiTs seem to have reduced developer risk by requiring 
electricity utilities to connect all eligible renewable generators, and provide economic and 
regulatory certainty by guaranteeing a long term electricity purchase contract through a 
transparent and administratively straightforward process [30, 38]. These administrative 
changes derived from FiT development clearly benefit the small-scale renewable energy 
industry in terms of levelling basic access in a similar manner to large institutional and political 
players in the energy industry, and also enable a greater level of discourse and co-
involvement of highly capable private and public decision-makers [3].  
The Stern Review (2007) noted FiTs achieve larger deployment at lower costs when 
compared to market-oriented tradable quota schemes [32], as project developers perceive 
higher levels of risk under tradable quota schemes. The higher perception of risk centres 
around the future market value of the certificates in tradable quota schemes [39], and 
consequently developers will likely require higher returns. Therefore, the crucial characteristic 
of FiTs seem to be the greater policy certainty which reduces project developer’s risk, creating 
an economically efficient support mechanism relative to tradable quota schemes [30, 38, 40, 
41]. However, FiTs have been employed to primarily attract small-scale domestic renewable 
energy systems investment, for which the drivers and the associated financial risk tolerance of 
proponents are not the same as for large-scale projects. As the RET and SCS have fixed the 
price of SGU credits to AUD40.00 per REC, this may provide sufficient certainty to domestic 
project developers without the influence of FiTs. Furthermore, FiTs without a fixed rate period, 
or a perception that the policy will not be supported for long, may be deemed too risky by the 
majority of domestic project developers. This may be a contributing factor in the ACT, although 
further analysis is necessary. Nonetheless, the known FiT hazards of high fixed prices leading 
to large budgetary implications from ‘windfall profits’ (often made by new market entrants at 
the expense of long-term players), is likely to have negative consequences for the states that 
developed such generous, yet short-sighted policies. In theory, the benefits of these policies 
have passed both to householders and businesses that comprise the small-scale renewable 
energy industry. However, these benefits are likely to be short lived (along with many 
businesses1
Despite the inherent difficulty in determining policy efficacy over time, there is 
significant merit for policymakers to implement stable and lasting renewable energy policies 
with the high level of political risk associated with renewable energy decisionmaking [30, 41]. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that when FiTs are developed without a due diligence assessment 
with regard to the actual costs of renewable electricity generation and developer return on 
investment, it is unlikely that the FiT will sustainably facilitate small-scale renewable energy 
industries over time. The basic concern with FiTs is the determination of a suitable tariff rate 
which fails to promote significant deployment, and prevents inadvertent ‘windfall profits’ to 
developers leading to inefficient investment [40, 41]. The stand-out FiT example in this 
research is the ‘overly attractive’ NSW FiT which clearly did not consider the influence of the 
federal tradable quota policies and resulted in a dramatic increase in SWT capacity in NSW. 
Whilst criticism of the NSW FiT is appropriate, the FiTs of the other Australian states (VIC, 
WA and ACT) should not escape attention as all have failed to stimulate the SWT industry to 
any noticeable extent. 
) when FiT policies that are too generous are removed, and in many cases the 
Australian householder now may pay higher prices for their electricity than available from 
electricity retailers [42, 43]. To provide useful analyses of the medium-to-long-term influence of 
these policies on niche renewable energy markets (such as the small wind sector) requires 
collaborative government and market actor cooperation to document the benefits, costs and 
lessons learned in the process. 
This research suggests Australian policymakers explore ‘conservatively attractive’ 
renewable energy support mechanisms that assist a diversity of emerging technologies to 
balance risk and reward over longer time horizons. Such mechanisms should ideally reflect 
both market values and economic values (internalised externalities and social 
                                                 
1 This assertion is based on private discussion between the authors and professional members of  
national renewable energy industry networks. 
costs/benefits), and also the cost of the technology for the developer to generate competitive 
renewable electricity in the geographical location of the network it is proposed to be installed 
[44]. This approach can be contrasted against the recent rapid increase in SWT capacity 
primarily only in NSW, due to the combination of the amended federal tradable quota 
schemes and the ‘less than moderate’ NSW FiT (since revised).  
 
5. Conclusions 
At an international level, the limited penetration and growth of comparable SWT 
installed capacity in Australia is dwarfed by the UK and the USA, each of which have 
exhibited over 100 times the SWT installed capacity over the last decade [8-10]. Australian 
policies can be seen to have delayed the provision of a stable base onto which a sustainable 
SWT industry can be built, and have not supported emerging technologies generally. This 
has largely been due to inadequacy of consistent policy incentives supporting the emerging 
SWT sector in Australia, specifically the technology-neutral tradable quota schemes 
targeting least-cost generation rather than diversity. Like most emerging technologies, the 
higher cost of grid-connected SWT systems relative to network electricity remains the 
primary barrier to their deployment, and this research demonstrates that the FiTs and 
tradable quota schemes to date have failed to address this critical barrier in a consistent 
manner. 
This research suggests that project developer attitudes to risk may influence installed 
capacity of emerging technologies to a greater extent that is generally recognised in policy 
circles. The example of between the high uptake of the NSW FiT and low uptake of the similar 
ACT FiT is an interesting case in point which needs further investigation. Complicating this 
simple assumption are information asymmetries, the recent revision and implementation of 
Australian tradable quota schemes and FiTs, and their aggregate influence. This assertion will 
require further assessment when sufficient data becomes available. This research infers that 
government ideology, the lack of detailed analysis with respect to renewable energy policy 
development, and the exclusion from policymaking of  manufacturers, service industry 
professionals and independent experts, continues to undermine the foundations of a 
sustainable renewable energy industry [2, 31, 42, 45, 46]. 
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